报 告 人： 姜 涛
报告时间： 2020年9月26日 14:30-16:30
地点： 腾讯会议 （ID：135 668 810 ）
摘要：This study examines a matching queue problem (double-sided matching queue) where customers are loss-averse with respect to their waiting times. We first set the reference point and construct the loss-averse customers’ utility function, then we investigate the customers’ strategic behavior regarding their joining or balking dilemma, with reference to the information unavailable. Next, we derive the service providers’ optimal pricing and capacity-sizing decisions. We find that compared to the fully rational customers, the loss-averse behavior could reduce the joining probability of customers and drive down the service price. Furthermore, the profit function of the service providers could be a unimodal function of the servers’ queue capacity size, with the servers’ optimal queue capacity size increasing with the increase in the degree of the customers’ loss aversion. Moreover, different potential market sizes may lead to different values of the profit, that is, under different levels of the customers’ arrival rate, the service providers should make a reasonable and timely adjustment for the servers’ queue capacity size to guarantee their profits.
报告人简介：
姜涛，山东科技大学经济管理学院副教授，硕士生导师，研究方向为包括随机运筹与优化、排队经济学、排队博弈、服务运作管理，以第一作者和通讯作者发表SCI期刊论文20余篇，目前主持国家自然科学基金和省基金多项。
